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NOTES FOR BRIEFING

DIA and OSR have already briefed you on their respective functions. My purpose is to explain how national intelligence estimates are produced by ONE in collaboration with DIA, OSR, and others -- and also, if there is time, the role of ONE in relation to the AHWG and MC 161.

The basic principle governing this subject is that the production of national (as distinguished from departmental) intelligence estimates is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence.

During the war (1942-1945) there was a US JIC, created in conscious imitation of the [REDACTED] While that was better than our previous experience with conflicting departmental estimates, our experience of joint estimating by a committee convinced us that too much substance and clarity is lost in seeking agreement among six sovereign, self-serving powers.

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The National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense, also established the Central Intelligence Agency under a Director responsible only to the President and the National Security Council.

The Act distinguished between departmental and national intelligence, and made the DCI solely responsible for producing national intelligence.

The DCI was required to make use of the resources of the established departmental intelligence agencies and to consult their chiefs in an advisory body now called the U.S. Intelligence Board -- but, having considered all the information on the subject available to the Government and all the arguments regarding its interpretation, he was required to draw and report his own conclusion, subject only to the right of any departmental intelligence chief to record a dissenting view on a substantial issue.

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The object of this arrangement was fourfold: (1) to ensure that all intelligence resources of the U.S. were brought to bear on intelligence problems of national importance; (2) to limit compromise and obfuscation by vesting a power of decision in a single officer free of the influence of departmental interest; (3) to prevent the suppression of important divergent judgments; and (4) to force the departmental intelligence chiefs to concur or dissent in context (as distinguished from publishing divergent views in separate, uncoordinated papers).

Thus the policy-maker considering his problems in the light of an NIE could be assured that he had all the pertinent information before him in one document.

How is national intelligence distinguished from departmental intelligence? It cannot be done on the basis of subject matter. For example, such an estimate as NIE 11-14-68, Soviet General Purpose Forces, might ^{seem} ~~be considered~~ to be the Defense Department's business -- that is, DIA's. It is an NIE because (1) it is a matter of important concern in the formulation of national policy, by the President and the National Security Council, and (2) it transcends the competence of DIA, in that we have come to realize that political and economic as well as technical military considerations have bearing on the make-up of Soviet military forces.

Another very important consideration is that the policy-makers cannot rely on the objectivity of departmental appraisals. This is not to say that DIA is dishonest, but only that it is influenced by departmental interests. The same consideration applies to State in the case of a political estimate. State would have a natural tendency toward policy advocacy.

Perhaps the distinction can be clarified as follows. Departmental intelligence would cover the entire range of departmental interest, going to a level of detail of ^{concern} ~~interest~~ only to departmental planners. National intelligence would be limited to matters of important concern to the President, the National Security Council, and staff elements concerned with the formulation of

national policy. The departmental agencies would participate in the production of an NIE, of course -- DIA very importantly in the case of NIE 11-14. In their subsequent formulations of departmental intelligence they would be bound by the conclusions of the NIE, unless they had entered a formal dissent.

We have a hard time maintaining this distinction. In the Defense Department, for example, systems analysts and even military planners tend not to accept as reliable any intelligence that has not been certified by inclusion in an NIE. Consequently we are under constant pressure by the Service intelligence agencies themselves to include in NIEs technical details that are properly departmental intelligence. That is a great affliction to us.

The Office of National Estimates is the Director's personal staff for the production of national intelligence estimates. It is a relatively small office of about 70 people (50 professional and 20 clerical).

ONE has no basic research mission. We keep ourselves generally well informed by reading other people's research and current intelligence reports, but for the substance of our estimates we depend on contributions obtained from departmental agencies, such as DIA, and from other offices of CIA, such as OSR.

The function of ONE is to exercise disinterested critical judgment regarding the substance of such contributions, to draw conclusions from them, and to prepare a draft estimate for the consideration of the DCI and WEIB. This is not a simple matter of joining together editorially the contributions received. Although we depend on others for our inputs, there is value added by manufacture in ONE.

The responsibility for this exercise of critical judgment is vested in the Board of National Estimates, which is unique in the intelligence world.

The Board is not a committee representing various interests. It is a body of about 12 men personally selected for appropriate experience and proven qualities of judgment, all of them servants of the DCI.

Although Board members are not specialists in any narrow sense, they can be classified by background of experience as lawyers or professors of history or economics with considerable experience in Government service (both professions provide excellent training in the interpretation of fragmentary evidence), or retired generals and ambassadors, or men with long and distinguished careers in intelligence.

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In my own case, for a ready example, I was a Ph.D. in history who was also an Army reserve officer and was called to active duty in military intelligence in 1940. I have been in CIA since I left the Army, and have been a member of the Board since it was formed in 1950.

The other members of the Board who concern themselves particularly with military estimates are [REDACTED] both retired Air Force officers, and [REDACTED] a retired Army officer with a distinguished career in military intelligence. We should also have an admiral, but have none at present. 25X1A9a 25X1A9a

The Board is supported by an Estimates Staff composed of proven and selected middle-grade professional intelligence officers, including one from each of the three services.

This staff is organized into six regional sections, plus one section specializing in Soviet military and technical subjects. The chief of this military section happens to be a graduate of the Imperial Defence College.

I shall not detain you with a detailed account of the procedures whereby national estimates are initiated, terms of reference are formulated, and contributions are obtained. Suffice it to say that the Staff produces a first draft on the basis of its critical judgment of the contributions; the Board reviews and perfects that draft; the Board sends its draft to the departmental

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agencies for their consideration and subsequently goes over it again in consultation with departmental representatives; and finally the Board submits its final draft to the DCI and USIB for their action.

One member of the Board is designated to have particular charge of each estimate, chairing all meetings on it. (From recurring designations to chair recurring estimates Board members do become specialists of a sort. For instance, I have chaired all of the annual estimates in the 11-14 series -- but I have, also chaired estimates on totally unrelated subjects.)

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The entire Board participates in the review of the Staff draft, but the review of the Board draft with the departmental representatives is conducted by the chairman for that particular estimate with the support of only one or two colleagues. This ad hoc chairman can, of course, consult the entire Board on any point at issue if he feels a need to do so.

In conducting this review with the departmental representatives, this ad hoc chairman is in a position analogous to that of the DCI in USIB. Having heard the argument, he decides what the draft text shall say. He may modify it, if he finds the argument persuasive, or he may decide that the issue is so important and intractable that the difference in estimative judgment should be made clear and explicit by inviting a dissent. It is in making such judgments that the Board member earns his pay.

This being our practice, you can see what we think of the doctrine that the Steering Committee of the ANIWC is incompetent to make a decision, that all substantive issues must be referred back to the "experts" for resolution. The import of that doctrine is that the servants should rule the house. Of course the "experts" should be fully consulted, but we hold that their superiors are responsible to exercise superior judgment.

That brings me to MC 161.

The U. S. position in an international intelligence estimate is, of course, a national intelligence position for which the DCI is responsible.

On the other hand, MC 161 is a Military Committee paper. The Joint Chiefs of Staff instruct the U.S. member of the Military Committee, and DIA is their intelligence agency.

This legitimate jurisdictional problem has been resolved by agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, as follows:

DIA prepares the first draft of US position papers for MC 161, but is required to derive its draft from the relevant national estimates.

The DIA draft is then reviewed and amended by the Board of National Estimates and departmental representatives in the same way ^{that a draft} ~~as a~~ NIE would be.

Similarly, the Board's draft is reviewed and "accepted" by the DCI and USIB prior to "approval" by the JCS.

The Head of the US Delegation is designated by the JCS (from DIA), but the DCI sends an officer to advise him (the Board member who chaired the preparation of the US position papers). The function of this adviser is, of course, to keep the Delegation true to the US position -- or at least to know whether any departure therefrom was warranted by sound intelligence considerations.

Finally, the DCI and USIB review the finished MC 161 and advise the JCS whether to approve it.

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[REDACTED] was in command of the U.S. Delegation at Brussels -- I was only his adviser -- but he was disposed to accept my advice for three reasons:

- (1) It was his first time out, my sixth in succession.
- (2) I understood the substance of the U.S. position better than did he or any of his DIA subordinates, having chaired NIE 11-14-68 and the preparation of the US Position Papers for MC 161/69.
- (3) He knew that the JCS would not approve the MC 161 that he brought back to Washington unless it was acceptable to the DCI and USIB.